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Philosophy of Religion Work-in-Progress Group |
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This page is no longer updated. Please visit this page instead: https://www.ryerson.ca/philosophy/kraay/philosophy-of-religion-work-in-progress/ |
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Fall 2019 | |
Title: An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager Speaker: Liz Jackson (ANU/Ryerson) Date/Time: Monday, December 16th. Location: JOR-502 |
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Abstract: Imagine you had an unlimited amount
of time to ask an omniscient being anything you wanted. The potential epistemic
benefits would be enormous, if not infinite: endless pieces of significant
knowledge/true belief/justified belief. I argue that considerations like these
point to an epistemic version of Pascal's wager.
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Title: On Necessary Gratuitous Evil Speaker: Michael Almeida (UT-San Antonio) [via Skype] Date/Time: Tuesday, November 26th, 12:00-2:00. Location: JOR-440 |
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Abstract: The standard position on moral perfection
and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary
condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil
we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is
false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state
of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does -- no matter how many
gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents -- it is necessarily true that
God coexists with gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil
cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil
presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient,
essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings.
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Title: The Autonomy and Dignity Arguments for Anti-Theism Speaker: Kirk Lougheed (Concordia University of Edmonton) [via Skype] Date/Time: Tuesday, November 19th, 12:00-2:00 Location: JOR-502 |
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Abstract: This paper is a draft chapter in a book I'm
currently writing. The book explores the axiological status of theism, with
particular focus on developing arguments for anti-theism (the view that God's
existence does, or would, detract from the value of our world). In this chapter
I explore two distinct arguments for anti-theism, one based on autonomy and
other on dignity. I first argue that while autonomy has been gestured at in the
literature as a reason in favour of anti-theism (including by myself), upon further
inspection it's difficult to see how such an argument could be successful. For
on many different understandings of autonomy, it's simply false that God's
existence does (or would) violate it to any significant degree. I suggest that
the worry that God violates our autonomy is better understood as a dignity
harm. Thus, in the second half of this chapter I develop an argument for
anti-theism based on the idea that God's existence violates our dignity. I
argue that on many different conceptions of dignity, it turns out God's
existence would (or does) violate our dignity to a significant degree. I
conclude that the scope of this argument ultimately rests on whether worlds
where people do not have dignity can be better than worlds where those same
people do have dignity.
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Title: Possibility Premises Speaker: Tyron Goldschmidt (Rochester) Date/Time: Thursday, October 24th, 1:00-3:00 Location: JOR-440 |
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Abstract: Ontological arguments often depend on a possibility premise, like: a maximally great being is possible. Alas, recent attempts to defend possibility premises don't work. |
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Winter 2019 | |
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Title: The Coherence of Anti-Theism Speaker: Guy Kahane (Oxford University) [via Skype] Date/Time: Monday, May 27th, 10:00-12:00. Location: JOR-502 |
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Abstract: Anti-theists
hold that God's existence would make things worse, and that we should
prefer God not to exist. In this paper, I will consider several
arguments against anti-theism put forward by Kraay & Dragos,
Schellenberg and (if time permits) Tooley. These arguments try to avoid
disputing the anti-theist's substantive axiological claims but instead
claim to show, in different ways, that anti-theism is simply
incompatible with a proper understanding of what it would mean for God
to exist -- because, for example, God-s existence would entail that no
gratuitous evil exists. I will try to show that these arguments aren't
successful. To reject anti-theism, one must engage in substantive
axiological debate.
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Title: God and the Value of Free Will Speaker: Luke Teeninga (Oxford University) Date/Time: Friday, May 10th, 12:00-2:00. Location: JOR-502 | |
Abstract: It
is standard practice to appeal to libertarian free will to explain how
God's existence might be compatible with much of the evil we see in the
actual world. Libertarian free will has also been important for certain
responses to the argument for atheism from divine hiddenness. But what
is often neglected in appealing to libertarian free will is an
explanation of why God would
create us with such free will in the first place. Laura Ekstrom argues
that free will is simply not worth the cost. J.L. Schellenberg takes it
a step further and argues that, if it turns out we have libertarian
free will, that is actually evidence against
God's existence, since the benefit of free will does not outweigh its
risk of evil. In this paper I discuss a few reasons God might have for
creating libertarian free will. | |
Title: From Parts to Whole (and Back Again): Rowe on Clarke on the Cosmological Argument Speaker: Richard B. Davis (Tyndale University) Date/Time: Friday, May 3rd, 11:00-1:00. [Please note the earlier-than-usual start time!] Location: JOR-502 | |
Abstract: According
to the late William Rowe, Samuel Clarke tries to establish the
proposition that it is possible for there to be no dependent beings by
inferring it from the proposition that no dependent being necessarily
exists" - an inference not "sanctioned by any valid rule of modal
logic." Thus, "a vital portion of the reasoning in the Cosmological
Argument rests on [an] unproved premise" (Nous,
1971). I believe that Rowe's modal accusation here is misconceived. I
begin with a brief sketch of Clarke's Argument. Then I show that Rowe's
composition complaint falters, since (as he admits elsewhere) "it is
not always a fallacy to infer that a whole has a certain property from
the premise that all of its constituent parts have that property"
(Mind, 1962). Clarke's inference, I argue, is an exception to this
general rule.
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Title: Creativity in Creation Speaker: Meghan Page (Loyola University, Maryland) [via Skype] Date/Time: Monday, April 29th, 12:00-2:00 Location: JOR-502 | |
The world
actualization model of creation depicts God's creative choice as the
selection of one complete state of affairs from many possibilities.
While this model dominates current discussions of creation in
philosophy of religion, I argue it implies God is a maker rather than a
creator. I develop this distinction
with the help of Margaret Boden's work on intellectual creativity, and
then explore various ways of relaxing the tension between the world
actualization model and divine creativity. Finally, I sketch an
account of divine creativity and show how it might reshape various
debates in the philosophy of religion.
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Title: The Possibility of Racism in Heaven Speaker: Leland Harper (Siena Heights University) Date/Time: Friday, March 15th, 11:00-1:00 Location: JOR-502 | |
Abstract: Many
would scoff at the idea that racism could possibly exist in Heaven.
Heaven is supposed to be a place that is free of struggles, hatred,
violence and pain. The existence of something as negative as racism, at
least in its harshest forms, is surely not something that could be
compatible with such a place as Heaven. Even if we grant that God
created this utopian realm for us to enjoy in the afterlife, a crucial
question still remains: for whom is Heaven supposed to be the
greatest possible place? Depending on how that question is answered,
and how exactly we flesh out our concept of Heaven, we may end up with
a version of Heaven in which the existence of racism is possible. In
this paper I argue that if we conceive of a communal Heaven, one that
is the greatest possible place for all of its collective inhabitants,
then it is not possible for racism to exist there. If, on the other
hand, we conceive of personal Heaven, one where each individual has
their own distinct "perfect world" in the afterlife, then it is
possible that there are certain instances in which Heaven contains
racism. This paper serves as a comparative account of two drastically
different conceptions of Heaven and details how opting for one over the
other could commit the believer to accepting the possibility of racism,
or any other number of generally negatively-viewed "isms," existing in
certain instantiations of individualized Heaven.
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Fall 2018 | |
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Title:
Circular and Question-Begging Ways to
Deflect Defeat from Religious Disagreement and Debunking Arguments Speaker: Andrew Moon, Virginia Commonwealth University [via Skype] Date/Time: Friday, December 7th, 12:00-2:00 Location: JOR-440 | |
Abstract: This
paper is about two underexplored types of higher-level propositions and
their relevance to religious epistemology, specifically, religious
debunking arguments and religious disagreement. The first type is the epistemically self-promoting proposition,
which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that one
reliably believes it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my
argument that certain religious believers can permissibly wield an
epistemically circular argument in order to deflect potential defeaters
from certain religious debunking arguments. The second type is the epistemically others-demoting proposition,
which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that
others are unreliable with respect to it. Such a proposition plays a
key role in my argument that certain religious believers can
permissibly wield a question-begging argument in orde to deflect
potential defeaters from certain types of religious disagreement. | |
Title: Sastisfactory Accounts of Divine Creation Speaker: Marshall Naylor, University of Texas (San Antonio) [via Skype] Date/Time: Friday, November 23rd, 12:10-2:00 Location: JOR-502 | |
Abstract:
Not just any account of divine creation is adequate. For example,
accounts that exacerbate the problems of evil, the problem of no best
world, the problem of divine freedom, and cannot preserve contingency
in metaphysical space would have less theoretical utility than an
account which solves these problems. An account with less utility
provides fewer reasons to believe it is correct. Multiverse theorists
Klaas Kraay, Timothy O'Connor, and Donald Turner have accounts of
divine creation. I present some adequacy conditions for divine
creation, which I believe enjoy prima facie plausibility. I argue that
multiverse accounts meet these conditions to a lesser degree, and so
have fewer reasons to believe they are correct, than an alternative
account I have in mind.
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Title: A Faithful Response to Disagreement Speaker: Lara Buchak, UC Berkeley [via Skype] Date/Time: Friday, November 9th, 12:10-2:00 Location: JOR-802 | |
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Title: Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil God Hypothesis Speaker: Kirk Lougheed, Doctoral Candidate, McMaster University Date/Time: Friday, September 21st, 12:00-2:00 Location: JOR-802 | |
Abstract: Conciliationism is the view that says when an agent who believes P becomes aware of an epistemic peer who believes not-P, she encounters a (partial) defeater for her belief that P.
Strong versions of conciliationism pose a sceptical threat to many, if
not most, religious beliefs, since religion is rife with peer
disagreement.
In a recent paper, I argue that one way for a religious believer to
aviod sceptical challenges posed by conciliationism is by appealing to
the evidential import of religious experience. Not only can religious
experience be used to establish a relevant evidential asymmetry between
disagreeing parties, but reliable reports of such experiences also
start to put pressure on the religious sceptic to conciliate toward her
religious opponent. Recently, however, Asha Lancaster-Thomas has posed
a highly innovative challenge to the evidential import of religious
experience. She argues that (i) negative religious experiecnes provide
direct evidence for an evil God, and also that (ii) positive religious
experiences provide indirect evidence for an evil God. In light of
this, both positive and negative experiences aren't just equally
compatible with an evil God, they support the existence of an evil God
more than that of a good God. I argue that the strength of Lancaster-Thomas' objection depends on the conception of God she has in view. If her target is monotheism unconnected to any particular religion (and I think it is), then her argument hits its target. The evil God hypothesis gives us reason to reject my argument from religious experience. However, I argue that Lancaster-Thomas's objection doesn't necessarily apply to other theistic conceptions of God. For instance, she too quickly dismisses the legitimacy of appeals to Satan for the Christian theist wanting to use arguments from religious experience. This is because appealing to Satan is no ad hoc addition to Christianity invented only to avoid the evil god challenge. Also, Langaster-Thomas never considers the possibility that the existence of a good God and evil God are compatible. Perhaps there could be two omnipotent beings who cannot overpower each other, if such a requirement is relevantly analogous to demanding that God square a circle. Finally, if we merely take the existence eof religious experience (both negative and positive) as evidence for supernaturalism (and hence against naturalism), it's not clear that the evil God challenge can be raised against supernaturalism. Thus, while Lancaster-Thomas' objection to classical monotheism is correct, more work remains to be done in exploring whether (in the context of religious experience) the evil God challenge supports something like ontological naturalism, or if the evil god challenge applies only to classical monotheism and not any other conceptions of theism. | |
Winter 2017 | |
Title: A Discussion with Peter van Inwagen about Evolution and the Problem of Evil Speaker: Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame / Duke University Date/Time: Friday, April 28th, 12:00-2:00 Location: EPH142 | |
A new festschrift on Peter van Inwagen's philosophy contains criticisms of his work together with his responses. In Chapter 11, Alex Rosenberg criticizes van Inwagen's argument for the compatibility of Darwinism and theism. In Chapter 8, Louise Antony
criticizes van Inwagen's response to the problem of evil. In this
session, van Inwagen will lead a discussion of these critics'
arguments, along with his replies. The papers by Rosenberg and
Antony will be circulated in advance, along with van Inwagen's replies.
If you wish to receive copies, and you are not on the mailing list for
this group, email Klaas Kraay at kraay@ryerson.ca. | |
Title: Who Must Benefit from Hiddenness? Speaker: Luke Teeninga, D.Phil Candidate, Oxford University Date/Time: Tuesday, March 21st, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor (JOR-502) | |
Abstract: What
I will call the "patient-centred principle" states that God would allow
some person S to be the victim of an evil for the sake of some good G only if
G sufficiently benefits S. Is the patient-centred principle true, and,
if so, is a similar principle true of divine hiddenness? That is, would
God remain hidden from some person S for the sake of some good G only
if G sufficiently benefits S? I will argue that the patient-centred
principle has a number of exceptions, even in the case of evil, and so
only a fairly qualified version of it might be true. I will also argue
that nothing like it is true with regards to divine hiddenness. | |
Title: The Goods of Atheism Argument: A Defence of Wide, Impersonal Anti-Theism Speaker: Kirk Lougheed, PhD Candidate, McMaster University Date/Time: Tuesday, March 7th, 1:00-3:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, 7th Floor Boardroom (JOR-730) | |
Abstract: Consider
two possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism
is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world
is rational to prefer? In this paper, I explore a defence of the
somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the
atheistic world, all else being equal. This view has recently been
called 'anti-theism'. The focus of my argument will be to show that
there are goods that obtain on atheism that contribute to the positive
overall value of the world. Such
goods include the ability to solve problems on one's own, take
immediate responsibility for one's actions, bravery, autonomy, and
privacy. Thus, the obtaining of these goods makes it rational to prefer
that God not exist (at least when the alternative world would be a
similar theistic world). I conclude by responding to the most promising
objection to the argument, which is that the goods of atheism could
never outweigh certain goods that obtain on theism. | |
Title: If There is a Hole, it is Not God-Shaped Speaker: Guy Kahane, Oxford University [via Skype] Date/Time: Tuesday, February 7th, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502) | |
Title: Unity Itself: Plotinus, Divine Simplicity, and Perfect Being Theology Speaker: Caleb Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver) Date/Time: Monday, January 9th, 2017, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 7th Floor, Room 730, Ryerson University | |
Abstract: I
show why Plotinus thinks that strong divine simplicity follows from two
principles that perfect-being theologians are committed to: (1) the
ultimate being needs no further explanation; and (2) the ultimate
being is absolutely ontologically independent. Plotinus argues that the
ultimate being cannot have internal parts. If the ultimate being has
distinct metaphysical parts, the whole world would depend up on them in
some way, violating (2). If the ultimate being's attributes were
distinct from each other, then we would need a further explanation of
why they are united in one being, violating (1). Plotinus' formulations
put pressure on moderate classical theists to find weakened versions of
these principles that are still strong enough for their purposes.
Attackers of metaphysical theism, by contrast, may use Plotinus' views
as a reductio ad absurdum. | |
Fall 2016 | |
Title: Why Rhoda's Case for Open Theism Fails Speaker: Job Morales (PhD Candidate, University of Western Ontario) Date/Time: Tuesday, December 6th, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 10th Floor, Room 1043 (Ryerson University) | |
Abstract: Alan Rhoda (2008) defines generic open theism as the commitment to the following theses: (1) broadly classical theism, that there exists a God with a maximal set of compossible, great-making properties; (2) future contingency, that the future is in some respects causally open; and (3) EC incompatibility,
that it is impossible for the future to be epistemically settled in any
respect in which it is causally open. In his 2007, Rhoda defends
generic open theism against non-open free-will theism, which affirms
future contingency but denies EC incompatibility. He thinks that the
truth of EC incompatibility depends up on the truth of AC incompatibility,
the thesis that it is impossible for the future to be alethically
settled in any respect in which it is causally open. For Rhoda, the
truth of this latter thesis depends on the correctness of Peircean
semantics over Ockhamist semantics. According to the Ockhamist, the
truth of a future proposition depends only on what will obtain in the
future. According to the Peicean, the truth of a future proposition
depends on whether sufficient conditions for its truth obtain at the
time of its utterance. In my paper, I attempt to undermine Rhoda's
argument for generic open theism by defending Ockhamist semantics over
Peircean semantics. Whereas Rhoda thinks that predictions of varying
degrees of modal or causal force facour Peicean semantics over
Ockhamist semantics, I argue that they favour the opposite. I also
address Rhoda's objection that even if Ockhamist semantics is correct,
no one - not even God - could properly assert unqualified predictions
about the future. | |
Title: God, Evil, and Infinite Value Speaker: Marshall Naylor (MA Candidate, University of Texas, San Antonio) [Via Skype] Date/Time: Thursday, November 17th, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 8th Floor, Room 802, Ryerson University | |
Abstract: The
traditional problems of evil and their solutions assume that the
overall value of a world can be increased or decreased. Furthermore,
the traditional problems of evil and their solutions make the
distinction between gratuitous and non-gratuitous evil central to their
approaches. In this paper, I argue that problems of evil and their
solutions are both mistaken. Traditional theism conceives God as
unsurpassably and infinitely good. Mark Johnson, taking a cue from
Georg Cantor's work, understands God's value as absolutely infinite: an
undiminishable and unsurpassable value that exceeds the cardinality of
every infinite set. Since God necessarily exists, every possible world
is absolutely, infinitely good. I conclude that the overall value of a
world cannot be increased or decreased given God's omnibenevolence, and
the distinction between gratuitous and non-gratuitous evil is
irrelevant to both the problems and solutions. | |
Title: Institutions as Conscientious Objectors? Yes (and No) Speakers: Philip Shadd (Research Associate, Institute for Christian Studies) and Joshua Shadd, MD. Date/Time: Thursday, October 27th, 12:00-2:00 Location: SLC 516 | |
Abstract:
On February 6, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that
doctors in Canada should be allowed to help their patients die. But
while the ruling recognizes individual doctors as having a right of
refusal, a more controversial question raised is this: Can
institutions, and not just individuals, claim conscientious objector
status? Would-be claimants might include Catholic and Mennonite
hospitals. In this article, we outline a two-part case for institutions
as conscientious objectors. First, we consider conditions for the
possibility of institutional objection. Institutional rights ought not
be dismissed on the grounds that institutions like hospitals cannot
have rights. The growing body of philosophical literature on group
agency, such as that of List and Pettit (Group Agency,
2011), indicates they can. Neither should it be assumed that
institutional rights are reducible to individual rights. At least in
regards to medical assistance in dying, conscientious objection at the
institutional level importantly differs from the individual level.
Having established institutional objection as a coherent possibility,
the second part of the paper develops the following argument for why
qualifying institutions deserve this status. Hospitals possess an
institutional right of refusal because they possess a more general
right of institutional self-governance which includes the prerogative
both to choose their institutions' governing values and to choose in
light of these values what medical procedures they will deliver. And
they possess a more general right of self-governance because they exist
alongside government, not beneath it, as institutional agents of equal
moral status. Ours is an argument from institutional equality, informed
by the neo-Calvinist tradition of political theology unique for its
emphasis on institutional pluralism. Our argument implies that while
hospitals have a right of refusal, it is a mistake to conceive this
right in terms of religious freedom. Moreover, this is a principled
right not based simply on pragmatic considerations, one based not on
consequentialist but deontological grounds. The issue and argument
should especially be of interest to anyone concerned with religion,
given that religious reservations to physician-assisted death are
common. | |
Title: Religious Disagreement Speaker: Kirk Lougheed, PhD Candidate, McMaster University Date/Time: Tuesday, September 13th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502) | |
Abstract: Many
religious believers do not appear to take the existence of religious
disagreement as a serious challenge to the rationality of their
religious beliefs. Bryan Frances notes that "in an enormous number of
cases people think, at least implicitly, that their group is in a
better position to judge [the truth about religious claims]. I will
think my group knows something the critics have missed" (Frances 2014,
165). Perhaps at least implicitly, religious believers tend to dismiss
worries based on disagreement by appealing to the fact that they enjoy
a special insight that their opponent fails to possess. This special
insight can constitute a relevant epistemic asymmetry between two
opponents who are otherwise epistemic peers, thereby justifying
reasonable religious disagreement. I argue that this type of
explanation is underdeveloped, given that appealing to a special
insight is equally available to both opponents in disputes over
religious beliefs. Self-trust, immediacy, and the reliability of
introspection are not good enough candidates to explain the special
insight view. As such, there is good reason to reject responses to
religious disagreement that appeal to special insight as the
justification for reasonable religious disagreement. Religious
believers need to do more work to explain the relevant epistemic
advantage they allegedly have over their non-religious opponents. A
potential explanation may lie in empirical investigations of religious
experience, since such studies will be able to offer a potential
relevant epistemic asymmetrey in objective nad public terms. However,
in this work on religious experience, Phillip K. Wiebe speculates that
religious experiences might be obective, but also private. This differs
significantly from scientific evidence which is public. I conclude that
if religious experiences are private, they can potentially justify a
religious believer remaining steadfast in the face of disagreement.
Initially, it might be thought that the private nature of such
experiences explains why apealing to them may not be satisfying to
opponents. But if testimonial knowledge of private religious
experiences are legitimate, not only do they solve the problem of
religious disagreement for the religious believer, but they start to
put epistemic pressure on the religious sceptic. | |
Winter/Spring 2016 | |
Title:
Faith,
Evidence-Gathering, and Rationality |
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Title: Regularities, Laws, and an Exceedingly Modest Premise for a Cosmological Argument Speaker: Travis Dumsday, Canada Research Chair in Theology and Philosophy of Science, Concordia University of Edmonton Date/Time: Friday, March 18th, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 2nd Floor Boardroom (JOR-204, inside the Economics Department), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: In
reply to certain cosmological arguments for theism, critics regularly argue
that the causal principle ex nihilo nihil fit may be false. For example, responding to a portion of
Aquinas' third way, Mackie (1982, p. 89) entertains the idea that contingent
objects can come into existence out of nothing without a cause: "A third
objection concerns the premise that 'what does not exist cannot begin to be
except through something that is'. This
is, of course, a form of the principle that nothing can come from nothing; the
idea then is that if our series of impermanent things had broken off, it could
never have started again after a gap.
But is this an a priori truth?
As Hume pointed out, we can certainly conceive an uncaused
beginning-to-be of an object; if what we can thus conceive is nevertheless in
some way impossible, this still requires to be shown." A bit later, challenging
that same principle as employed in the Kalam argument, Mackie (1982, p. 94)
reiterates: "We have no good ground for an a priori certainty that there
could not have been a sheer unexplained beginning of things." Various
theistic counter-replies to this challenge have emerged. One type of strategy is to double down on ex nihilo nihil fit by: (a) emphasizing its
apparent intuitive appeal; (b) challenging the claim that it is either
genuinely imaginable or conceivable that something pop into existence without a
cause, or that conceivability entails possibility; (c) employing inference to
the best explanation (i.e., we never experience objects popping into existence
seemingly at random, and the best explanation for the absence of such chaos is
that random beginnings are impossible); or (d) situating it within a broader
modal ontology that explicitly rules out the possibility of objects popping
into existence causelessly. Another, very different strategy of
counter-reply is to grant for the sake of argument that the principle is false,
while maintaining that sound cosmological arguments can be formulated even with
this concession in place. Notably, one can employ weaker opening premise
formulated in modal terms, proceeding for instance from the proposition that
for any contingent object coming into existence it is at least possible that it (or a duplicate)
have a cause.
My aim here is to try out a related strategy for weakening the relevant opening premise. Granting that it is possible for a contingent object to come into existence out of nothing without a cause, I proceed from the extremely modest claim that the obtaining of exceptionless (or nearly exceptionless) longstanding contingent regularities demands an explanation. As such, the contingent regularity that empirically accessible macro-level contingent objects do not pop into existence causelessly demands explanation. And as it turns out, that explanation will have to be in terms of an object or objects possessed of at least some of the traditional divine attributes. More precisely, I will explicate and defend the following argument: Premise 1: All exceptionless (or nearly exceptionless) longstanding contingent regularities have an explanation that accounts for why they obtain. Premise 2: It is an exceptionless (or nearly exceptionless) longstanding contingent regularity that empirically accessible macro-level contingent objects do not come into existence out of nothing without a cause. Premise 3 / Conclusion 1: Therefore, there is an explanation that accounts for why that exceptionless (or nearly exceptionless) longstanding contingent regularity obtains. Premise 4: An explanation for that regularity can be found only in a causally powerful and indestructible object (or objects). Premise 5: / Conclusion 2 Therefore there exists a causally powerful and indestructible object (or objects). Premise 6: If an object is indestructible, then it is non-physical. Premise 7 / Conclusion 3: Therefore there exists a causally powerful, non-physical object (or objects). Premise 8: If there exists a causally powerful, non-physical object (or objects), then metaphysical naturalism is false. Final Conclusion: Therefore metaphysical naturalism is false. |
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Title: Faith as a Species of Reason Speaker: Trent Dougherty, Baylor University Date/Time: Friday, March 11th, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: Some people think faith and
reason our opposed to one another. Others think faith and reason are in
harmony. I argue that faith -- in its doxastic sense -- just is a kind of
evidence. The key to making this work is
understanding the difference between doxastic faith and the act of faith. I argue that we need to stay away from
William James and instead travel with Locke on one side and Pascal on the other.
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Title: Skeptical
Theism, Plantinga's Religious Epistemology, and Debunking Arguments |
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Title: Theistic
Modal Realism and Gratuitous Evil? |
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Abstract: According to theistic
modal realism, there is an Anselmian God that exists in every concrete possible
world. Michael Almeida argues that theistic modal realism has the resources to
account for the possibility of gratuitous evil, an evil such that its
prevention would result in a net-benefit of goodness. This is because God's
prevention of a gratuitous evil from befalling some person implies that there
is a (concrete) possible world in which God permits that evil to occur to that
person's counterpart. I argue that, once we focus upon the distinction between
preventing an evil and merely doing something that does not result in the
occurrence of that evil, there is good reason to think that theistic modal realism
is in fact incompatible with the possibility of gratuitous evil.
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Fall 2015 |
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Title:
Situationism and Soul-Making Speaker: Matthew Baddorf (PhD Candidate, University of Rochester) Date/Time: Friday, November 20th, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: Soul-making theodicies
seek to justify God's permitting some or all of the evil in the world
on the
grounds that evil can help us achieve, through our moral
decision-making,
valuable character traits. Philosophical situationism is a movement in
ethical
theory based on the situationist school in psychology; situationists
hold that
character traits either do not exist in humans, or that they are
neither as
common nor as robust and stable as we tend to think. I argue that
situationism
provides an unappreciated difficulty for a prominent sort of
soul-making
theodicy: if situationism is correct, then this gives us strong
evidence that
the world does not tend to produce the sorts of character traits that
the
soul-making theodicist needs. I also make a tentative recommendation to
soul-making theodicists about how they might avoid, or at least
minimize, the
problem situationism introduces.
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Title:
I Don't Want
the World to be Like That! Recasting
Anti-Theism. |
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Abstract:
It
seems to me that anti-theism, understood as the claim that 'God's
existence makes the world worse', will always struggle to be viable.
There are various routes to this conclusion; I find these arguments
convincing and I will not retrace well-worn ground. However, I think
the viability of anti-theism can be saved if we reconsider what
'anti-theism' could mean, what other forms it could take. I will argue
that we can (and should) recast 'anti-theism', not as the claim that
God's existence makes the world worse, but as the preference that it
(counterfactually) would. That is, anti-theism is a statement of
preference for a world of equal or greater value than our own, but in
which God's existence is not a good thing. I will illustrate the
viability of this preference with a few (highly plausible) analogous
examples, and conclude with a tentative attempt to offer a new
definition of anti-theism: A preference for/pro-attitude towards/'being
for' the closest possible world in which God would not be a
better-making feature of your world, where that world is of equal or
greater value to the world in which God would be a better-making
feature of your world. I conclude by pointing out that this new version
of anti-theism is easily connected with the traditional statements of
anti-theism (e.g., 'I don't want the world to be like that!'), and can
be justified by entirely plausible, rational, and mundane preferences;
as a result, this version of anti-theism looks to be viable.
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Title:
Skepticism,
Personal Anti-Theism, and the Meaningful Life Argument: A Reply to
Myron A.
Penner Speaker: Kirk Lougheed (PhD Candidate, McMaster University) Date/Time: Tuesday, October 27th 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: In a recent
article, Myron
A. Penner develops, defends, but ultimately rejects what he takes to be
the
best argument for personal anti-theism: the Meaningful Life Argument.
Penner's
objections focus on human fallibility with respect to identifying and
weighing
goods that contribute to a meaningful life, and only obtain if God does
not
exist. I argue that Penner's account is flawed for two reasons. First,
while
the type of skepticism about human judgment about goods might be
justified, it
cuts both ways. If the Meaningful Life Argument fails, then so do any
arguments
for pro-theism based on identifying and weighing goods that contribute
to a
meaningful life. Second, I show that the debate about the Meaningful
Life
Argument would be better advanced by an assessment of the specific
goods in
questions, rather than worrying about skepticism that applies equally
to all
parties in the debate.
|
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Title:
God's
Good World: Aquinas, Kretzmann, and Dewan on Divine Freedom in Creation Speaker: Joel Chopp (PhD Candidate, University of Toronto) Date/Time: Location: Jorgenson Hall, 7th Floor Boardroom (JOR-730), Ryerson University |
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Abstract:
Thomas
Aquinas affirmed that God is both maximally
good and genuinely free, particularly with respect to God's choice to
create
the world. Norman Kretzmann has challenged Aquinas' position, arguing
that
given his commitment to the Dionysian principle of the diffusiveness of
the
Good, Aquinas should have held that the creation of some possible world
external to God was a necessary entailment of God's being. Lawrence
Dewan has responded
to Kretzmann, arguing that creation cannot be absolutely necessary
given that
it is properly said to be an act of the will, and when an act of the
will is
ordered toward an end but is not necessary for the existence of that
end it
cannot be absolutely necessary. In this paper, I argue that Dewan's
objection
misfires: what would be required for Kretzmann's account to fail
Dewan's
condition for acts of the will would be Kretzmann claiming that this
actual world is
the necessary result of God's being, that is, that God had neither the
freedom
of contrariety or contradiction in his choice to create. However, this
is not
Kretzmann's position: he affirms the freedom of contrariety but not
contradiction. I conclude by offering an alternative critique of
Kretzmann's
proposal, suggesting that necessity of the externality of the diffusion
of
Goodness is the vulnerable point in his argument. I argue that by
locating the
diffusion of the Good within the Triune life of God one can affirm the
Dinoynsian
principle, deny the necessity of creation, and nevertheless account post factum for creation in terms of
God's being and Goodness.
|
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Title:
Counterfactuals
of Divine Freedom Speaker: Yishai Cohen (PhD Candidate, Syracuse University) Date/Time: Tuesday, September 29th, 11:30-1:30pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502), Ryerson University |
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Winter/Spring 2015 | |
Title:
Who is an Epistemic Peer and
Why it Matters for Religious Disagreement Speaker: Kirk Lougheed, PhD Candidate, Monash University Date/Time: Friday, May 8th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, 4th Floor Boardroom (JOR-440), Ryerson University |
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Title:
Aquinas and Maimonides on
Relations Speaker: Jennifer Hart Weed, University of New Brunswick Date/Time: Tuesday, April 28th, 12:30-2:30 Location: Jorgenson Hall, 4th Floor Boardroom (JOR-440), Ryerson Universiy |
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Abstract: In
Book I, chapter fifty-two of The
Guide for the Perplexed, Moses Maimonides
claims that there are no relations that hold between God and creatures,
including relations of similarity. He
argues that since God is absolutely simple, he does not possess any
relations. In contrast, Thomas Aquinas
argues in De potentia Dei
that God is related to creatures through relations of
reason. In this paper, I will outline
each of these views in order to determine if Aquinas is successful in
his
defense of relations of reason and whether or not this defense is an
improvement over Maimonides' approach to relations.
I will question also whether the respective
views of relations of Maimonides and Aquinas are compatible with the
doctrine
of divine simplicity and with the theological doctrine of creation. I will conclude by showing that the
philosophy of relations of Maimonides and Aquinas contributes greatly
to their
respective approaches to naming God.
|
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Title:
The Skeptical Rejoinder to
the Problem of Evil Speaker: Ian Wilks, Acadia University Date/Time: Friday, April 24th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, 4th Floor Boardroom (JOR-440), Ryerson University |
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Title:
Considering the Impossible:
Cognitive Decoupling and the Axiological Investigation of God's
Existence Speaker: Josh Mugg, PhD Candidate, York University Date/Time: Friday, March 27th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, 5th Floor Boardroom (JOR-502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: According to the theist who thinks God's existence is necessary, the following conditional is a counterpossible: 'if God did not exist, then the world would be better (or worse).' Likewise, according to the atheist who thinks God's nonexistence is necessary, the following is a counterpossible: 'if God existed, then the world would be better (or worse).' On standard semantics (such as both Lewis and Stalnaker's), counterpossible conditionals are trivially true. This threatens the possibility of an axiological investigation of God's existence. Others, such as Davis and Franks (forthcoming), have argued that counterpossibles can be meaningful. This assuages metaphysical worries, but one might still protest: even if such claims are meaningful, we cannot evaluate them because the antecedent is not conceivable. Thus, the objection against an axiological investigation of God's existence moves from being metaphysical to being psychological. My purpose here is to reply to this psychological objection. I do so by applying work on cognitive decoupling to considering counterpossibles. Cognitive decoupling occurs when subjects extract information from a representation and perform computations on that extracted information. I offer examples from two domains: pretend play and abstract reasoning. According to Nichols and Stich (2003), Leslie (1987), and Stanovich (2011), cognitive decoupling occurs when subjects make an informationally impoverished copy of a primary representation. Subjects can use this secondary representation in combination with other propositional attitudes (including beliefs, acceptances, or 'imaginings'). I argue that if a subject ignores those propositions that generate contradictions when combined with the antecedent of the counterpossible, then that subject can consider the counterpossible. I use impossible pictures (such as 'Waterfall' or 'Ascending and Descending,' by Escher) to elucidate my position: it is no problem for us to conceive of portions of these sketches. Problems only arise when we try to conceive of what is represented in the picture as a whole. This has an important upshot for the axiological investigation of God's existence: the dialectic will have to move forward piecemeal-wise, rather than conceiving of maximal states of affairs in which God does exist (on the one hand), and in which God does not exist (on the other). |
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Title:
On Plantingean Pro-Theism: Transworld Depravity, Incarnation,
and Atonement Speaker: Richard Davis and W. Paul Franks, Tyndale University College Date/Time: Thursday, March 5th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, Fifth Floor Boardoom (JOR-502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: According
to Alvin Plantinga, the logical problem of evil isn't a problem, since
(as he thinks) it is entirely possible that "sinless worlds" -- worlds
in which creatures are significantly free but never go morally wrong --
cannot be actualized by God. But if so, then given that God has
actualized a morally good world, it follows that evil does exist.
Hence, the existence of God and the existence of evil are compatible.
More recently, Plantinga has suggested an axiological extension of his
conclusion, claiming that "it is plausible to think...the best possible
worlds contain Incarnation and Atonement, or at any rate Atonement, and
hence also contain sin and evil." In this
paper, we attempt to show that the modal concepts at work in
Plantinga's free will defense fail to support (and in fact wholly
undercut) this interesting idea that Incarnation and Atonement worlds
(hereafter, I&A) are among the best. We argue that if Plantinga's
argument succeeds, as many believe that it does, I&A worlds are
actually impossible. Presumably, this isn't an outcome Plantinga would
welcome.
|
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Title:
The Evolution of Religion: Memetic Equilibrium as a
Proximate Cause Speaker: Christopher di Carlo Date/Time: Wednesday, February 18th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, Second Floor Boardroom (JOR-204), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: In this paper, I examine the evolution of religious belief in light of known constraints on human cognitive evolution. I consider factors in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness such as hominin migratory patterns, food acquisition, physiological, climatological and geographic changes, tool use, and various artefact records. I also consider the emergence of consciousness and language, the use of human reasoning skills, and specific neuroendocrine factors, to develop a hypothesis regarding proximate causes of religious behaviour. Religions developed as a memetic response to natural occurrences viz. the emergence of conscious symbolic representation in relation to currently evolved conceptual schemas. As human consciousness and languages evolved, so too did our ancestors' capacity to solve environmental problems in more conceptually sophisticated ways. Problem solving produces a feeling of environmental control, stability, in short - memetic equilibrium. But the pay-off is not merely practical - it is biochemical - and it comes in the form of neurotransmitters. |
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Fall 2014 | |
Title:
Pro-Theism, Anti-Theism,
and Human Status Speaker: Julien Beillard (Ryerson University) Date/Time: Friday, December 5th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, Fourth Floor Boardroom (JOR-440), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: Kahane (2011) suggests an argument for anti-theism - the claim that if God does not exist, the world is better than it would otherwise be. The values of human moral equality and autonomy cannot be fully realized if God exists, he thinks - our status cannot be the one we want. Fine-tuning this argument, the key premises seem to be these: (1) the degrees to which these values are realized in some Godless world relevantly similar to ours are higher than those to which they are realized in any such Godly world, and (2) the value of their realization in that Godless world is comparable to its value in some Godly ones. Against this reasoning, I argue that equality and autonomy are probably not realized to any significant degree in any Godless world unless their realization there is far less valuable for us than in some close Godly world. The realization and value of equality and autonomy have metaphysical preconditions, I contend, and these are not very probable on atheism but highly probable on some forms of theism. The values of equality and autonomy thus turn out to be reasons for pro-theism. If it is good that we are autonomous equals, the world is better (for us, in that respect) if God exists. Since I doubt the antecedent I do not accept this line of argument either. But those who value equality and autonomy probably should. |
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Title:
Skepticism, Skeptical Theism, Moral Cognition Speaker: Myron A. Penner (Trinity Western University) Date/Time: Tuesday, November 4th, 12:00-2:00 Location: Jorgenson Hall, Fifth Floor Boardroom (JOR502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract:
Skeptical
theism is, in part, a claim about the scope of our moral cognition. We
often make judgments about the scope of our cognitive capacities - that
is, we often make judgments about what putative bits of information we
could, or couldn't, plausibly acquire given the kinds of cognitive
equipment we possess. Sometimes these scope judgments are automatic and
pre-reflective; sometimes these scope judgments are more reflective and
considered. Sometimes these judgments are justified (possibly
evidence-based or the result of reliable or properly functioning
truth-apt faculties); sometimes these judgments are not justified. In
this paper, I set out some plausible conditions that specify when
skepticism in general, and skepticism about cognitive capacities in
particular, is justified. Using Michael Bergmann's canonical
formulation of skeptical theism, I then argue that skeptical theism is
an instance of justified skepticism. This is because there is good
philosophical and empirical support for the skeptical theist's claims
about the scope of our moral cognitive faculties.
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|
Title:
'Nature is Difficult to
Define': A Response to R.J. Feenstra Concerning Kenotic Christological
Method Speaker: Eric Mabry (Doctoral Candidate, Toronto School of Theology, University of Toronto) Date/Time: Tuesday, October 21st, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, Fifth Floor Boardroom (JOR502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: In his 2006 essay "A Kenotic Christological Method for Understanding the Divine Attributes," R.J. Feenstra develops "a version of kenotic Christology that attempts to adhere to Christological orthodoxy" and argues that it can account for certain "perplexing biblical claims about Jesus Christ," such as his growth in wisdom or his lack of knowledge about the time of the end of the world. He believes that such an orthodox kenotic account "offers a fruitful method for deepening our understanding of the divine attributes." On his theory, "omniscience-unless-kenotically-incarnate" is an essential attribute of God. This theory, however, seems to imply a change in God, which is excluded by the Chalcedonian formula which Feenstra himself accepts as a normative statement of Christian faith regarding the mystery of the incarnation. Instead, I propose an alternate Christological model which conceives of nature not as a set of properties but as an interior principle of operation. This model enables one to maintain that Christ is omniscient according to his divinity but limited in his knowledge according to his humanity without compromising the unchanging character of God. |
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Title:
Might God Prefer Natural Evil?
Speakers:
Jeremy Dawson
(MA Candidate, Ryerson University)
Date/Time:
Friday, October 17th,
2014, 12:00-2:00pm
Location: Jorgenson
Hall, Fifth Floor Boardroom (JOR502), Ryerson University |
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|
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Title:
The Thin Theory of Existence: A Theistic Critique
Speakers:
Josh
Harris
(Doctoral Candidate, Institute for Christian Studies / Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam)
Date/Time:
Wednesday,
October 1st,
2014, 12:00-2:00pm
Location: Jorgenson
Hall, Fourth Floor Boardroom (JOR440), Ryerson University |
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Winter/Spring 2014 | |
Title:
Pro-Theism and the Added
Value of Morally Good Agents
Speakers:
Myron
A.
Penner
(Trinity Western University) and Kirk Lougheed (MA Candidate, Ryerson
University)
Date/Time:
Friday,
May 9th, 2014, 12:00-2:00pm
Location: Jorgenson
Hall, Fourth Floor Boardroom (JOR440), Ryerson University
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Title:
Defending the Purpose Theory of
Meaning in Life
Speaker:
Jason
Poettcker (MA Candidate, Ryerson University)
Date/Time: Friday, April 25th, 2014,
1:00-3:00pm
Location: POD358,
Ryerson
University
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Title:
Many Goods from Nonresistant
Nonbelief
Speaker:
Luke
Teeninga (MA Candidate, Ryerson University)
Date/Time:
Wednesday,
April 16th, 2014, 12:00-2:00pm
Location:
Jorgenson
Hall, Fourth
Floor Boardroom (JOR440), Ryerson University
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Title: If God is the First Cause of Everything that
Happens,
can Creatures be Free? Speaker: Elmar Kremer (Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto) Date/Time: Friday, April 4th, 2014, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, Fifth Floor Boardroom (JOR502), Ryerson University |
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Abstract:
There is
much to recommend the Thomistic view
that God is the first cause of free human choices and actions. That
view,
however, can seem to imply that human beings are not free agents, but
rather
puppets manipulated by God. Barry Miller's account of divine and
creaturely
causation removes that appearance. In Miller's account, God and
creatures are
causes in different senses of the word: God's causing is always ex
nihilo, and
creaturely causing always changes a previously existing thing or
situation.
Unlike created causes, God never acts on anything. Hence the illusion
that God
manipulates created agents is removed.
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Title: An Open Theistic Multiverse?
Speaker: Tim Blank (MA Candidate, Ryerson University) Date/Time: Thursday, March 20th, 2014, 2:15-4:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, Eighth Floor Boardroom (JOR802), Ryerson University |
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Title:
Theism and the Counterpossible
Consensus Speaker: Richard Brian Davis (Tyndale University College) Date/Time: Tuesday, March 11th, 2014, 3:00-5:00pm. Location: ENG-LG-05, George Vari Engineering and Computer Centre, Ryerson University |
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Abstract:
According to Edward Wierenga, the considerations in favour of the
Lewis-Stalnaker consensus on counterpossibles (namely, that they are
all trivially true) are sufficient to overturn any reason a classical
theist might have for thinking some counterpossibles - e.g. if God
didn't exist, the world would still exist - are nontrivially false. In
this paper, I examine these considerations as they coalesce into two
lines of related support for the Standard Account: David Lewis'
original "SHRUG" defence, and the more recent Zagzebski-Wierenga
argument based on logical entailment ("ABLE", for short). I attempt to
show that the problems besetting these defences give rise to additional
reasons for classical theists to break with the consensus and divide
the counterpossible terrain nonvacuously into the true and the false. (This
talk is
also part of Ryerson's Philosophy
Department Visiting Speaker Series.)
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Title: Intellectual
Tennis without a Net? Thought Experiments and Theology Speaker: Yiftach Fehige (University of Toronto) Date/Time: Tuesday, February 25th, 2014, 12:00-2:00pm Location: Jorgenson Hall, Eighth Floor Boardroom (JOR802), Ryerson University |
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Abstract: In response to the claim that thought experimentation is mere theology and thus of no cognitive value, this paper investigates the relationship between thought experiments and theology, and this in three respects. First, it explores the theological dimension of Newton's famous bucket experiment. Second, it looks at the role of the biblical narrative of Adam's Fall in discussions that resulted in the foundations of modern science. Finally, the paper argues that there are at least two classes of thought experiments in medieval thought that depend for their existence on theological assumptions. |
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Title: The Deistic Multiverse Speaker : Leland Harper (Doctoral Candidate, University of Birmingham, UK) Date/Time: Friday, February 21st, 2014, 12:00-2:00pm. Location: Jorgenson Hall, Fifth Floor Boardroom (JOR502), Ryerson University |
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Fall 2013 | |
Title:
Counterpossibles and the "Terrible" Divine Command
Deity |
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Abstract: In a series of articles in Religious Studies, Wes Morriston has launched what can only be considered a full-scale assault on the divine command theory (DCT) of morality. According to Morriston, proponents of this theory are committed to an "alarming" counterpossible: that if God did command an annual human sacrifice, it would be morally obligatory. Since only a "terrible" deity would do such a "terrible" thing, we should reject DCT. Indeed, if there were such a deity, the world be a terrible place - certainly far worse than it is. We argue that Morriston's non-standard method for assessing counterpossibles of this sort is flawed. Not only is the savvy DCT-ist at liberty to reject it, but Morriston's method badly misfires in the face of theistic activism - a metaphysical platform available to DCT-ists, according to which if God didn't exist, neither would anything else. |
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Title: Faith
as Acceptance: A Solution to the Problem of Religious Disagreement Speaker: Kirk Lougheed (MA Candidate, Ryerson University) Date/Time: Thursday, November 28th, 2013, 11:00am-1:00pm. Location: Jorgenson Hall, Eighth Floor Boardroom (JOR 802), Ryerson University |
|
Abstract:
The
epistemology of
disagreement has been a very popular topic in the recent philosophical
literature. The debate focuses on how I should respond when I disagree
with an
epistemic peer over a particular proposition, P, which I believe, and
my peer
disbelieves. The revisionist position holds that when I encounter such
disagreement, equal weight must be given to both views and hence I
should
revise my belief in P. This could require lowering my confidence in P
or withholding
belief in P. The anti-revisionist view claims that there are cases in
which
awareness of my peer's belief that not-P does not require changing my
belief
that P. Thus, the revisionist denies that there can be rational
disagreement
between epistemic peers, whereas the anti-revisionist claims that
epistemic
peers can rationally disagree. The revisionist position, if true, poses
a
serious threat to the rationality of religious belief. This is because
the
believer, when faced with peer disagreement over a religious
proposition, is
forced to lower or withhold her belief in that proposition. In this
paper I
seek to accomplish three tasks: First, I outline some of the prominent
arguments in the literature on disagreement for the revisionist
position.
Second, I argue that framing the problem of disagreement in terms of
acceptance, rather than belief in a proposition, offers support for the
anti-revisionist position. When I accept a proposition I choose to act
as if it
is true, regardless of whether or not I believe that proposition to be
true.
Third, I claim that the concept of faith is coherent with acceptance,
not just
belief. I conclude that, at least in some cases, faith as acceptance
provides a
way for there to be rational peer disagreement over religious
propositions. |
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Title: Pro-Theism and
the Added Value of Morally Good Agents |
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Abstract: |
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